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ADDITIONAL RELEVANT FACTS
The following facts are relevant to issues not apparent
from the trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of
Law, and therefore not treated in Appellant's Brief, but
raised initially in Respondents' Brief:
1.

Paragraph 9 of Rita Luke's Independent Contractor

Agreement states:
[Luke] shall have no authority to incur
expense,
enter
any
contract
or
make
representation or committment [sic] for and
behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority
specifically given, in writing, with respect
each such transaction.
2.

any
any
on
is
to

As of the date of the Luke Agreement, November 29,

1985, John Langley was "the broker" or "the acting broker" at
Prowswood.
3.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, pp. 125, 161.

John Langley had no authority to purchase real

property on behalf of Prowswood.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1,

p. 126.
4.

Expert witness Wilburn McDougal testified, "I think

most companies have had some type of a guaranteed sales
program."
5.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 130 (emphasis added).
Mr. McDougal further testified that, with respect

to his own company's guaranteed sales program, at times only
he was authorized to sign a buy-back agreement, at times one
of his managers could sign, and at times certain real estate

1

agents, those that had "the experience," could sign.

Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1. p. 132.
6.

Mr. McDougal

further testified that some agents

were authorized to sign buy-back agreements for his company
and some were not; it was an "individual situation."

Trial

Transcript. Vol. 1, p. 132.
7.

Mr. McDougal did not testify that it was usual,

typical, or incidental to their express authority for real
estate agents to bind their brokers to buy-back agreements.
8.

The Nielsons1

son-in-law,

Vince

Clayton,

was a

Prowswood employee at the time the Agreement was signed, and
had been for 15 years.
9.
to

the

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 38.

On June 10, 1986, Richard S. Prows wrote a letter
Nielsons

on

behalf

of

Prowswood

in

which

the

corporation refused to accept the obligation to purchase the
Nielsons' property. Exhibit 4-P.

(A copy is included in the

Addendum to Prowswood's Brief of Appellant.)
10.

According

to

the

uncontradicted

testimony

of

Richard S. Prows, Prowswood did not consider itself obligated
to repurchase the Nielsons1 property.
2./ P- 11.

2

Trial Transcript, Vol.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1.
agency

Standard of Review, The trial court's rulings on
and

ratification

are

best

viewed

as

presenting

questions of law or mixed questions of law and fact.

As

such, they are entitled to no deference on appeal but should
be reviewed for correctness.
2.

Statute

of

Frauds.

The

statute

of

frauds

was

sufficiently raised below and should be addressed on appeal.
3.

The "General Agent" Exception. The general agent

exception to the statute of frauds does not apply to this
case because Rita Luke was a special agent with respect to
the purchase of real estate.
4.

Statutory Authority of Real Estate Agents. White v.

Fox misreads the predecessor to Section 61-2-2.

Furthermore,

it is distinguishable on several grounds, the most important
being that John Langley, not Prowswood, was Rita Luke's
broker.
5.

White should not be extended by this Court.
Inherent Authority.

that Ms. Luke exercised

The trial court did not find

inherent authority, nor does the

record warrant such a finding.
6.

Ratification.

Far from manifesting an intent to be

bound, Richard S. Prows' June 10, 1986 letter rejects any
obligation to purchase the Nielsons' property.

3

ARGUMENT
1.
THIS COURT IS ENTITLED TO REVIEW
THE TRIAL COURTfS JUDGMENT FOR CORRECTNESS
a.

Agency Presents a Mixed Question of Law and Fact,

The nature and extent of a person's agency authority has
been held to be a mixed question of law and fact. Marouez v.
Raoid Harvest Co.. 1 Ariz.App. 138, 400 P.2d 345, 349 (1965),
vacated on other grounds, 99 Ariz. 363, 409 P.2d 285 (1965);
Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. D.N. Morrison Construction Co. ,
116 Fla. 66, 156 So. 385, 387 (1934); Hartley v. The Red Ball
Transit Co.. 344 111. 534, 176 N.E. 751, 757 (1931); State v.
Keeton Packing Co., 487 S.W.2d 775, 779 (Tex.App. 1972); 3
C.J.S. Agency @ 547, p. 479.

It has also been said that

while the existence of agency generally presents a question
of fact, when the underlying facts are not in dispute, the
question

of

whether

question of law.

an

agency

relationship

the

is a

Sparks v. Republic National Life Insurance

Co. , 132 Ariz. 529, 647 P.2d 1127, 1140 (1982).

apparently

exists

only Utah case on the

In what is

subject, the Utah

Supreme Court seemed to reflect this view, citing the rule
that agency is "as a general rule a question of fact for the
jury, aided by proper instructions from the court," then
distinguished it and affirmed the trial court's withholding
4

of the issue of agency from the jury. Adamson v. United Mine
Workers, 3 Utah 2d 37, 277 P.2d 972 (1954).
In this case, the underlying facts are not in dispute:
none

of

untrue.

the

testimony

is contradicted

as

The controversy centers on what legal conclusion to

draw from those facts: do they
agency?

or challenged

In

such

a

"add up" to any sort of

circumstance,

the

question

of

the

existence of agency is best viewed as a question of law or a
mixed question of law and fact.
The trial court tacitly acknowledged the mixed nature of
its finding of agency by reciting "Rita Luke had the apparent
authority to bind Prowswood to the terms of the Agreement" as
both a finding of fact and a conclusion of law.
Significantly, while a trial court's findings of fact
will not be set aside on review unless they are clearly
erroneous, Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a), mixed questions of law and
fact are not entitled to similar deference.
Upchurch, 696 P.2d 1195, 1200 (Utah 1985).

Maraulies v.

Generally, mixed

questions of law and fact are treated as questions of law and
reviewed de novo by the appellate court.

State v. Bishop,

753 P.2d 439, 464, n. 76 (Utah 1988), citing United States v.
McConney.

728 F.2d

1195

(9th Cir. 1984) (en banc),

cert,

denied, 469 U.S. 824 (1984); accord. State v. Crestani, 771
P.2d 1085, (Utah 1989).

Conclusions of law are reviewed on

appeal "for correctness without any deference to the trial
5

court•,f

Cove View Excavating and Construction Co, v. Flynn,

758 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah App. 1988).
Therefore, the trial court's determination
Luke had authority to bind Prowswood
deference

on

review,

but

may

be

that Rita

is not entitled to

reviewed

de

novo

for

correctness.
*>•

The Nielsons Cannot Both Claim the Benefit of the
"Clearly Erroneous" Standard and also Introduce Mew
Theories of Agency on Appeal.

The Nielsons cannot deny that agency presents at least a
mixed question of fact and law without being bound by the
trial court's "finding" of apparent—not inherent—authority.
In its Memorandum Decision, the trial court concludes that
Prowswood1s liability is based "on the apparent authority of
Ms. Luke as shown to plaintiffs."

Memorandum Decision, p. 7.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, drafted by the
Nielsons, speak exclusively of apparent authority.

The trial

court appeared to be quite clear on the legal principle on
which it relied.
Yet on appeal, the Nielsons rely most heavily on the
theory of inherent authority, which the trial court never
mentioned.

In so doing they argue that an appellate court

should affirm a judgment if it is sustainable "on any legal
theory apparent on the record, even if it different from the
theory stated by the trial court as the basis for its ruling
. . ."
6

(Emphasis added.)

Respondentfs Brief, p. 21, n.4.

Implicit in this argument is the assumption that what is at
issue here is not a factual finding but a legal conclusion:
what legal theory best accommodates the undisputed facts?
If the difference is indeed one of legal theory only,
and Prowswood believes that it is, the clearly erroneous
standard does not apply, and the trial court's decision is
reviewable for correctness.
If, on the other hand, the trial court's finding of
apparent authority was one of pure fact—an assumption of the
Nielson's contention that the "clearly erroneous" standard
applies—a
purely

finding of inherent authority would also be a

factual

finding.

Affirming

on that

basis would

therefore require this Court to find a fact that the trial
court never found.
c.

Construction of a Written
Question of Law on Appeal.

Document

Presents

a

The trial court also concluded that Prowswood ratified
the Agreement.

The

Nielsons

reliance upon Richard S. Prows1

defend

this

conclusion by

letter of June 10, 1986.

They admit that no extrinsic evidence supports the conclusion
of ratification. Respondent's Brief, p. 27.

Indeed, the only

relevant extrinsic evidence was the uncontradicted testimony
of Richard S. Prows that Prowswood did not consider itself
obligated to repurchase the property.

7

The

trial

court's

interpretation

of

an

unambiguous

written document, unaided by reference to extrinsic evidence,
is accorded no particular weight on review, but will be
reviewed

under

a

correctness

standard.

Craig

Food

Industries, Inc. v. Weihincr, 746 P.2d 279, 283 (Utah App.
1987).

Consequently, the proper standard for this Court to

apply in reviewing the trial courtfs finding or conclusion of
ratification

is

simply

whether

it

was

correct,

without

indulging any deference to the trial court's determination.
2.
THE ISSUE OF RITA LUKE'S AUTHORITY, INCLUDING
WRITTEN AUTHORITY, WAS TRIED AND IS PROPERLY BEFORE THIS COURT
It is indisputable that the statute of frauds is an
affirmative defense that must be pled.

Utah R. Civ. P. 8(c).

What is less clear is when the statute of frauds may be said
to have been pled.
While it is true that Prowswood did not cite Section 255-1 or 25-5-3 in its Answer, or use the words, "statute of
frauds,"
Prowswood

it

may

failed

not
to

be

assumed

affirmatively

without
plead

analysis
this

that

defense.

Indeed, many courts have held that a denial of the existence
of a contract is sufficient to raise the statute of frauds.
See, e.g. , Hunt v. Hunt, 261 N.C. 437, 135 S.E.2d 195, 199

8

(1964); Padaham v. Wilson Music Co,, 3 Wis.2d 363, 88 N.W.2d
679, 683 (1958).
Prowswood1s
Prowswood

Answer meets

affirmatively

or

alleged

exceeds
that

this principle.

"the

acts

of

the

Defendant Rita Luke were without the express, implied or
apparent authority of the Defendant Prowswood, Ltd. . . ."
Answer of Prowswood, Fifth Defense.

This allegation was not

merely a general denial of liability, but went directly to
Rita Lukefs authority.
apparent

authority,

If she lacked express, implied, or

she

surely

lacked

written

authority.

This allegation was therefore sufficient to put all parties
to

the

action

on

notice

that

the

authorization was an issue to be tried.

lack

of

written

The policy of Rule

8(c) was thus fulfilled.
Furthermore, since the Nielsons conducted no discovery
even on issues set forth in detail in the pleadings, failure
to plead
worked

the statute

no

prejudice

of frauds with greater
against

them

insofar

specificity
as

pretrial

discovery was concerned.
Finally, the lack of written authorization was implicit
in the Independent Contract Agreement between Rita Luke and
Prowswood,

which,

like

the

statute

of

frauds,

required

written authorization for her to enter into a contract to
purchase

real

estate.

This Agreement

was

entered

into

9

evidence at trial.

Exhibit 4-P.

Thus, the issue of written

authority was before the trial court at trial.
Obviously, Prowswood would have preferred leave to amend
its Answer based upon its motion filed more than one month
prior

to

obviated

trial.
any

This

dispute

housekeeping

later.

But

measure

this

Court

would

have

may

still

conclude, and should conclude, that Prowswood did not waive
its defense of the statute of frauds.
3.
RITA LUKE WAS NOT PROWSWOODfS GENERAL PURCHASING AGENT,
SO THE MATHIS EXCEPTION TO SECTION 25-5-1 DOES NOT APPLY
Respondents cite evidence from which the trial court
could possibly have concluded that Rita Luke was Prowswoodfs
general agent.

Brief of Respondents, p. 16.

In fact, the

trial court did not so conclude, but even if it had, its
conclusion would have been mistaken.
Mathis v. Madsen. 1 Utah 2d 46, 261 P.2d 952, 956 (1953)
reads into Utah Code Ann. @ 25-5-1 an exception for general
agents or executive officers of corporations.
the . agent

was

General

Manager

and

In that case,

President

of

the

corporation.
The Nielsons

contend that Rita Luke was Prowswood! s

general agent because she was "authorized to conduct a series
of transactions involving a continuity of service," the test
10

set out

in Restatement

(Second) of Agency

@ 3(1)(1957).

Prowswood concedes that Ms. Luke was its general agent for
purposes of selling listed real estate, since she did conduct
a series of such transactions over a period of years.

She

was therefore a general agent with respect to selling listed
properties.

But

she

never

purchased

properties

for

Prowswood.
Comment

b.

to the Restatement

section

quoted

above

addresses just this situation:
One is a general agent only as to those matters in
which there is continuity of employment. Thus one
who is a general agent with respect to some matters
may be a special agent with respect to a particular
transaction, as where the owner of a manufacturing
business directs his manager to purchase a country
estate for him.
(Emphasis
properties

added.)
was

Unlike

not

a

selling

matter

continuity of employment."

"in

properties,
which

purchasing

there

[was]

a

Indeed, the Nielsons were unable

to cite even a single instance where Ms. Luke purchased
property on behalf of Prowswood.

Therefore, with respect to

purchasing properties she was a special agent only, and the
Mathis exception to Section 25-5-1 does not apply.
To ignore this qualification to the general rule of the
Restatement

would

corporations.

effectively

repeal

Section

25-5-1

for

It would, for example, permit a real estate

agent without written authority to sell his broker's personal
residence or to obligate her to purchase a second residence.
11

4.
NEITHER SECTION 61-2-2(3) NOR WHITE V, FOX APPLIES HERE
The Nielsons rely upon Utah Code Ann. @ 61-2-2(7) and
White v. Fox, 665 P.2d 1297 (Utah 1983) to support the trial
court's conclusion that Rita Luke had apparent authority to
bind Prowswood to purchase the property.

In fact, these

authorities are irrelevant to a determination of apparent
authority.

The third partyfs

principal's

statements

or

reliance

actions

on the purported

regarding

the

agent's

authority is the sina qua non of apparent authority, and
there is not a shred of evidence that the Nielsons ever
relied upon any statement or act of Prowswood here.
Nielson

himself

testified

that

he

did

not.

Mr.

See Trial

Transcript, Vol. 1, p. 144.
However, these authorities are relevant to a different
theory of agency, which may perhaps be called

"statutory

agency," since it seems to owe its existence solely to one
statutory

provision.

Although

the trial

court

did

not

address this theory, the Nielsons urge it on appeal.
The former Section 61-2-3, predecessor to our present
Section 61-2-2(3), was part of Title 61, Chapter 2, "Division
of Real Estate."

It was strictly definitional in nature.

It

defined a real estate salesman as one "employed or engaged on
behalf of a licensed real estate broker to do or to deal in
any act or transaction" listed within the definition of a
12

broker.

In White, the Utah Supreme Court read this section

not as a definition, but as a grant of power.
the word "any" to mean "all."

It also read

Thus it wrote, "Our statutes

provide that, subject to certain limitations, real estate
agents are empowered to perform all acts or transactions that
their real estate broker may perform."
(emphasis

added).

Prowswood

submits

665 P.2d at 1302
that

this

was

a

misreading of the statutory intent of that section.
However, based on that reading, the court reasoned that
since the broker could waive his own commission, his real
estate agent could waive the commission of his broker, in
that case Parley White dba Parley White Realty Company.

Id.

While the reasoning of White is dubious, the Nielsons
would extend it even further, arguing by analogy that since a
broker may bind himself to purchase property, his real estate
agent can bind the broker to purchase property.

Therefore,

they reason, since Prowswood could bind itself to purchase
the Kochfs condominium, Rita Luke had statutory authority to
bind Prowswood to purchase the condominium.
number

of

There are a

reasons why this line of reasoning

should be

rejected:
First.

Section 61-2-2 is definitional: a person who

does any one of certain enumerated acts is deemed to be a
"real estate sales agent" for purposes of the Chapter and
therefore subject to its provisions.

This section was not
13

intended to grant every real estate agent blanket authority
to do everything his broker could do.

If a person must be

authorized to perform every act within the definition of a
broker to be a real estate agent, then Rita Luke was not one,
because she had no authority to obligate anyone to purchase
property.
Second.

A broker qua broker may purchase property "for

another" and, as in White, to collect commissions.
61-2-2(1).

Section

Additionally, a broker has the same right as

other persons to purchase property for himself, in which case
the Chapter does not apply.

See Section 61-2-3.

The Nielsons fail to observe this distinction.

They

urge this Court to apply the Chapter in a situation where
Prowswood would purchase real estate for itself.

To do so,

this Court would have to extend Section 61-2-2 past even
White.

Whatever its flaws, at least White only empowered the

real estate agent to bind his broker to a transaction in his
role as a broker, where he acted for another; the Nielsons
would empower a real estate agent to bind her broker with
respect

to

a

transaction

for

itself.

and

therefore

a

transaction outside the Chapter.
Third.

In White, there was no contractual provision

relevant to the scope of the agent's authority.

Therefore,

holding that Section 61-2-2 defined the limits of the agent's
authority did no violence to a lawful contract.
14

Here, Rita

Luke's

authority

was

expressly

limited

by

the

following

provision in Paragraph 9 of her contract with Prowswood:
[Luke] shall have no authority to incur
expense,
enter
any
contract
or
make
representation or committment [sic] for and
behalf of [Prowswood] unless such authority
specifically given, in writing, with respect
each such transaction.

any
any
on
is
to

Holding Section 61-2-2 applicable to this case would wreak
havoc in the real estate industry by instantly invalidating
every limitation on every broker's delegation of authority to
every real estate agent in the State of Utah.

Such a ruling

would represent a broad and unwarranted extension of White.
Fourth.

Most

importantly,

the

fatal

flaw

in

the

Nielsons' attempt to apply White here is that Prowswood was
not Rita Luke's broker.

The uncontested evidence at trial

established

that her broker as of the date of the Luke

Agreement,

November

29,

1985,

was

Mr.

John

Langley.

Therefore, the only conclusion permissible under White is
that Rita Luke had authority to bind John Langley, who is not
a party to this action.
Moreover,

Mr.

Langley's

uncontradicted

proffer

of

testimony was that he had no authority to purchase real
property on behalf of Prowswood.

Therefore, even if, under

White, Rita Luke had statutory authority to do every act
which John Langley was authorized to do, still she lacked
authority to bind Prowswood to the Agreement.

5.
LUKE LACKED INHERENT AUTHORITY TO BIND PROWSWOOD
The Nielsons argue on appeal that Rita Luke had inherent
authority to bind Prowswood.
a.

The Trial Court Did Not Find Inherent Authority,

The trial court did not find that Rita Luke had inherent
authority in either its Memorandum Decision or its Findings
of Fact

and Conclusions

of Law.

There is therefore no

finding of fact to which this Court must defer on appeal.
But even if there were, a determination of agency may be
viewed as a mixed question of law and fact and reviewed de
novo for correctness.

See pp. 4-6 supra.

Prowswood did not address this theory in its Brief of
Appellant

because

it

was

not

apparent

in

Memorandum Decision, Findings, or Conclusions.

the

Court's

As pointed

out above, pressing this theory on appeal, as the Nielsons
do,

is consistent

only with the view that a finding of

inherent authority
question

of

law

is not factual

and

in nature but a mixed

fact, and therefore

entitled

to no

particular deference by this Court.
Indeed, there is no factual conflict on this issue in
any event, only a question of the legal significance of
largely uncontradicted facts.
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b.

The Evidence Does Not Support a Finding of Inherent
Authority.

The doctrine of inherent authority is twofold.
aspect concerns the nature of the agent's acts.

One

The other

concerns the level of knowledge or belief of the third party.
Under the doctrine of inherent authority, an agent's
acts

bind

her

principal

only

if

they

"fall within the

apparent scope" of her authority, Harrison v. Auto Securities
Co. . 70 Utah 11, 18, 257 P. 677, 679 (1927), or, under the
Restatement's version of the rule, "usually accompany or are
incidental to transactions which the agent is authorized to
conduct."

Restatement (Second) of Agency § 161 (1957).

Rita Luke's acts meet neither criterion.

The Nielsons

claim that "It is a common marketing technique for a broker
to agree to purchase property in order to obtain a listing or
a

sale,

with

its

Respondents, p. 19.

attendant

commission."

Brief

of

This statement finds no basis in the

evidence and is merely the naked assertion of counsel.

The

Nielsons cite only the testimony of Richard S. Prows.

He

testified

that

Prowswood

would

while
agree

"there
to

have

been

purchase

a

uncommon" that it would take trade-ins.

occasions"
property,

where

"it

is

He also testified

that Prowswood would "not normally" have a program where if
someone buys its product it would buy theirs, but would do so
only on "very rare occasions."
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The Nielsons1 own expert witness, Wilburn McDougal, was
hardly more supportive of their position.

Contrary to the

Nielsons1 representation that Mr. McDougal "testified that
•most companies1 in this area have some type of guaranteed
sales program

. . ." Brief of Respondents, p.23

(emphasis

added), he in fact testified, "I think most companies have
had

some

type

added).

of

a guaranteed

sales program"

(emphasis

The clear implication of this statement is that

while most companies have in the past had guaranteed sales
programs,

they

no

longer

do.

With respect

to his own

company, Mr. McDougal further testified as follows:
Q

Were

agents

authorized

to

sign

that

[guaranteed buy-back] agreement?
A

We have, in the last ten years we've had times

when it is only my signature that is authorized or one
of my managers or certain real estate agents, those that
had the experience.
Q

So agents as a whole were not authorized to

sign?
A

No, some agents were authorized.

It is an

individual situation.
Q

So some agents were not authorized to sign?

A

This is right.

Trial Transcript, Vol. 1, p.132.
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The testimony before the trial court on the issue of
whether it was usual for an agent to be authorized to enter
into

a

guaranteed

sales

agreement

may

be

summarized

as

follows:
1.

Guaranteed sales programs were very uncommon for

Prowswood.
2.

Many companies have had such programs in the past,

3.

McDougal realty has had such programs.

4.

Sometimes only Mr. McDougal was authorized to sign

a guaranteed sales agreement.
5.

Sometimes one of his managers was authorized to

sign.
6.

Sometimes

certain

real

estate

agents

were

authorized to sign.
7.

At no time were all real estate agents authorized

to sign.
This testimony falls far short of meeting the Nielsons1
burden of proving that the authority to purchase property is
apparent merely from the fact that a person is a real estate
agent; or that the exercise of purchasing authority is usual
for real estate agents in general; or that it is incidental
to those acts—such as listing and selling property—that are
within a real estate agent's actual authority.
The second aspect of inherent authority focuses on the
third party, who must be "innocent," must have "dealt with
19

those agents in good faith,"

Harrison, supra, at 679, must

reasonably believe the agent is authorized, and must have no
notice that she is not authorized.

Restatement

(Second) §

161.
Mr. Nielson was hardly an "innocent" third party.
the contrary, he was knowledgeable
estate,

having

been

a

licensed

On

in the field of real
real

estate

broker

in

California and a licensed real estate broker in Utah since
1962.
had

He was also knowledgeable about Prowswood, since he

previously

been

employed

by

a Prowswood

subsidiary,

TransWest Building Supply, as a vice president in charge of
day-to-day operations.

Also, his son-in-law, Vince Clayton,

was a Prowswood employee.

He was aptly described by his

counsel at trial: "Mr. Nielson is a sophisticated man, there
[is] no question about that."

Trial Transcript Vol. 1, p. 6.

Mr. Nielson's experience and sophistication put him on
notice

that

Ms.

Luke

might

not

be

authorized

to

bind

Prowswood.

He testified at trial that he was "concerned as

to

or

whether

not

a

salesperson

had

Prowswood" to purchase the condominium.

authority

to bind

A reasonable person

with Mr. Nielsonfs sophistication, concern, experience, and
family contacts would have taken some step, such as placing a
single telephone call, to verify with Prowswood the authority
that Ms. Luke claimed.
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But Mr. Nielson did nothing.

In short, the Nielsons have failed to make a showing,
either

below

or

on appeal, that Rita

Luke had

inherent

authority to bind Prowswood.
6.
RICHARD S. PROWS' LETTER DID NOT RATIFY THE AGREEMENT
Since they do not respond to Prowswood's arguments, the
Nielsons apparently concede that Prowswood's acceptance of a
real estate commission from the Koches cannot constitute a
ratification of the Luke Agreement.

See Brief of Appellant,

Point 3.
Instead, they contend that the letter of June 10, 1986
from Richard S. Prows to the Nielsons ratified the Luke
Agreement.
As

explained

in

Point

I.e.

above,

a trial

court's

interpretation of a written document, without reliance upon
extrinsic testimony, is entitled to no deference on appeal
but

presents

correctness.

a

question

of

law

to

be

reviewed

for

See pp. 7-8, supra.

To ratify an act is to knowingly manifest an intent to
treat it as though it was authorized—to be bound by it—when
in fact it was unauthorized and not binding.

See Bradshaw v.

McBride, 649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982); Restatement (Second) of
Agency §@ 82 & 83.
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A copy of Mr. Prows1 June 10, 1986 letter is included in
the Addendum to Prowswood's Brief of Appellant.

Even a

cursory reading of this document will disclose that Mr. Prows
never manifested an intention to be bound by any agreement
that

would

obligate

Prowswood

In

he

condominium.
obligation.
Every

fact,

to purchase

emphatically

the

Nielson's

denied

any

such

Consider the following facts.
reference to the Luke Agreement

quotation marks: the "agreement."

is placed

in

Use of quotation marks in

this manner has the effect of negating the meaning of the
quoted term.

Thus, a reference to a man and his "wife"

carries the clear implication
married.

Similarly,

unmistakably
amusing.

that
In

referring

the

this

attempt

context,

conveyed Mr. Prows1

that they are not in fact

he

would

a

"joke"

communicates

at humor was not
the

quotation

marks

in fact
clearly

belief that no agreement between the

Nielsons and Prowswood existed.
Agreement,

to

have

Had he ratified the Luke

acknowledged

its

efficacy,

not

denied it.
In

Paragraph

4

of

his

June

10

letter,

Mr.

Prows

expressed concern to treat the dispute delicately in view of
Prowswood's feelings of friendship toward the Nielsons.

But

despite those feelings, he never acknowledged any willingness
to purchase the property.
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In

the

letter's

penultimate

paragraph,

Mr.

Prows

insisted that since Mr. Nielson was both a Utah real estate
broker and a former Prowswood employee, it must have occurred
to him that the commitment "you felt Rita was making when she
signed the "agreement" you prepared, was far in excess of the
authority granted to her . . . "

In other words, Mr. Prows,

far from adopting Ms. Luke's acts, continued to disclaim
them.

This

fact

eloquently

refutes

the

Nielsons'

construction of his letter.
In short, Prowswood submits that it is not possible to
reasonably detect in this letter any intent on the part of
Prowswood

"to ratify the Agreement

and

stand behind

leading sales agent, regardless of the outcome."
Respondents, p. 26. Mr.

Prows

was

very

its

Brief of

specific

as

to

outcomes: Prowswood would waive its commission, but it would
not purchase the unit.
Under the law, ratification requires that the purported
principal have "an intent to ratify"

Bradshaw v. McBride,

649 P.2d 74, 78 (Utah 1982), that is, an intent to be bound
by

the

acts

of

the

purported

agent.

The

only

intent

expressed in Richard S. Prows' June 10, 1986 letter is an
intent

not

to

purchase

the property

from

the Nielsons.

Therefore, no ratification could have occurred.
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CONCLUSION
The

trial

court's

rulings

were

ill-conceived,

as

witnessed by the Nielsons' arguments before this Court, which
attempt to recast the record into legal categories defensible
on appeal.

But even artful arguments cannot make a silk

purse out of the judgment below, which

should be reversed.

DATED: July^C^/, 1989
POOLE & SMITH

Poole
Frederic Voros, Jr.
itorneys for Defendantspell ant Prowswood
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